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Abstract
While there is extensive literature on states and knowl-
edge, there has been little focus on state ignorance:
instances where states are identified as lacking knowl-
edge relevant to addressing social problems. We pre-
sent the first systematic analysis of how states perceive
and respond to ignorance, developing a typology of
responses (denial, resignation, and elucidation). We
test and refine the typology through analyzing state
ignorance of unauthorized migration in Germany and
the UK, 1990–2006. Public authorities in both countries
responded to ignorance through both denial and resig-
nation. However, variations in control infrastructures
and bureaucratic cultures meant that “resignation”
took distinct forms. In the UK, pragmatism about the
limitations of state capacity implied that officials were
sanguine about their “ignorance,” with pressure ema-
nating from external political scrutiny. In Germany, by
contrast, officials faced an acute conflict between
bureaucratic and legal norms of the rule of law, and
constraints to enforcement. Both cases reveal profound
state ambivalence about elucidating social problems
over which they have limited control.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
There is a strong tradition of scholarship that views states as preoccupied with producing
knowledge to identify and address social problems (Foucault, 2000; Giddens, 1987; Lacey &
Furner, 1993; Wittrock & Wagner, 1996). Less explored are instances in which states are unable
or unwilling to produce knowledge about issues they are expected to address, or what we term
“state ignorance”. We define state ignorance as an awareness on the part of public authorities
that they lack knowledge relevant to addressing social problems. This concept offers an excel-
lent lens through which to interrogate theories of the state. How do states select and prioritize
which aspects of social problems to “see” or produce knowledge on, and which to overlook?
And how do they handle knowledge deficits, especially in areas where there are strong public
and political expectations about their capacity to address social problems?
A classic area for state ignorance is state monitoring and control of unauthorized migrants.
While unauthorized migration is generally constructed in political discourse as an issue that
states should address, states often tolerate or perpetuate a degree of ignorance about this
population–whether because of the methodological difficulties in monitoring or gathering data
on this social problem (Vogel, 2001); or to buffer them from scrutiny of their policies or perfor-
mance in this area (Bommes & Sciortino, 2011). Yet there has been surprisingly little attempt to
understand how such omissions are identified and communicated by states and other actors; or
how such ascriptions of ignorance are handled by political leaders and officials. Given deeply
entrenched norms about the epistemic authority of states, how do public authorities deal with
ignorance, both in their external communications, and in terms of their internal organizational
beliefs and goals?
This article contributes to theory-building on state ignorance, through examining how offi-
cials and political leaders in two countries—Germany and the U.K.—have handled their lack of
knowledge about unauthorized migration. We begin by conceptualizing state ignorance as a
spectrum between “strategic ignorance” and “ignorance by omission”. We then distinguish
three broad responses to ignorance: elucidation, implying an attempt to gather more knowledge
on unauthorized migrants; denial, which involves downplaying the scale or importance of the
problem; and resignation, implying that officials acknowledge the problem but accept their
inability to address it. We analyze the institutional and political factors shaping which of these
responses is adopted, and explore the implications of the respective strategies for governments
and public administration. We then present analysis of state responses to ignorance in Germany
and the United Kingdom between 1990 and 2006. The analysis is based primarily on 56 inter-
views with policymakers in Germany and the United Kingdom.
2 | THEORIZING STATE IGNORANCE
2.1 | Strategic ignorance and ignorance by omission
Historical and sociological literature on the state has tended to view the state as concerned with
mobilizing social knowledge to enable the effective steering of its population (Caplan &
Torpey, 2001; Torpey, 2000). By contrast, far less attention has been devoted to instances of state
ignorance: an awareness on the part of political leaders and public administration that they lack
relevant knowledge on/of social problems they are expected to address. In unpacking this con-
cept, it should be noted that ignorance is not simply the negation of that which is known. All
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observation involves selection, and at any point in time there will be a vast number of social
operations that have not (yet) been identified or observed (Luhmann, 1998). Indeed, literature
on bounded rationality and information processing has shown how organizations develop per-
ceptual filters that enable them to select very limited information from their environments, to
avoid being overwhelmed (Daft & Weick, 1984; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Instead, we need
to understand ignorance as an acknowledged discrepancy between what is known by public
authorities at a particular point in time, and that which they might reasonably have been
expected to know. Political ignorance is thus an acknowledged deficit, reflecting a gap between
what is perceived as appropriate and feasible to know, and that which is actually known.
Second, it is important to consider which observers recognize and label these knowledge
deficits. Indeed, the perception of what might reasonably be known will depend on the
positionality of the observer. Thus, political opponents, lobby groups or the media may have
quite exacting expectations about state knowledge, and may seek to expose instances of political
ignorance as serious transgressions. Whereas government actors may see such omissions as a
normal and acceptable consequence of limited state capacity or resources. Thus, the identifica-
tion of political ignorance may reflect political agendas or sectoral norms, and may vary
over time.
We should also consider what sorts of interests or rationalities might underpin state igno-
rance. We conceive of such ignorance as running along a spectrum, from more strategic igno-
rance, to inadvertent oversight. On the strategic end, politicians or public authorities may be
keen to sustain a degree of obfuscation if this aligns with political or economic goals
(McGoey, 2012a, 2012b). Ignorance in this sense is a resource for those wielding power,
enabling them to achieve ends that might not otherwise be politically viable (Rayner, 2012).
Another form of strategic ignorance may involve attempts to buffer the state from unfeasible
public expectations. Politicians may be keen to avoid drawing attention to social problems that
they are unable to address (Weick, 1998). On both accounts, states are aware of their deficient
knowledge of social problems, but reluctant to fill the gap, implying a form of “rational”
(Somin, 2015) or “preferred” ignorance (Haas & Vogt, 2015).
Alternatively, state ignorance may be understood as a form of oversight rather than a con-
scious attempt to obscure information. Such ignorance may take the form of neglect or
omission—a decision not to channel resources into producing knowledge of particular issues
because they are not seen as a priority. Thus information may be procurable, but the organiza-
tion does not consider it a priority to extract or process it, instead focusing on more pressing
tasks. State ignorance may also arise where actors external to the organization identify an omis-
sion; or where such oversight is revealed in retrospect, should the neglected issue subsequently
become identified as a social problem. Thus the simple fact that the government chooses not to
focus resources on a particular area of knowledge is not in itself an instance of state ignorance,
but may be identified as such if the state, or other actors, can plausibly construct it as an omis-
sion, whether at the time or retrospectively.
Not all social issues lend themselves to state ignorance. In many areas of state activity there
is abundant information about social problems, which may be directly accessed by the public,
or captured in official statistics or registration systems. In such areas, it may be difficult for pub-
lic authorities to sustain political ignorance. The issues most susceptible to ignorance are those
characterized by information-poor environments (Boswell, 2012), where there are limited
opportunities to produce knowledge on social problems. Of course, the availability of informa-
tion on social problems may change, as they become the object of attention for researchers, the
media, or political actors. But at any time, some areas will be characterized by an information-
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poor environment, which makes obfuscation more viable. Information-poor environments are
thus a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for the production of political ignorance. They
present states with a higher degree of discretion regarding whether or not to produce (further)
knowledge, or to leave a social problem in obscurity.
2.2 | Handling ignorance
The possibility of state ignorance raises important questions about how political leaders and
officials in the public administration handle such ignorance. As we saw, states are subject to
strong norms about their capacity to monitor their residents—indeed, the legitimacy of the state
has long been seen as contingent on its privileged access to knowledge (Geuss, 2001;
Weber, 1980, p. 129). We would expect these norms about state knowledge to be internalized in
organizational cultures, underpinning strong beliefs about the importance of evidence and
knowledge in policy-making. As a consequence, the acknowledgement of ignorance would cre-
ate discomfort or dissonance within bureaucracies, potentially affecting organizational morale
and internal legitimacy. Clearly, where ignorance is exposed, it may also create external prob-
lems of legitimacy for organizations. This pressure will be particularly pronounced where an
issue is politically salient, and there is political scrutiny of organizational performance. Organi-
zations may also be sensitive to the claims-making of interest groups who identify instances of
ignorance. Such claims may expose them to external expectations about how they should tackle
knowledge deficits and require them to develop responses.
How do political leaders and officials in public administration reconcile these norms and
expectations about knowledge with instances where they are aware of, or confronted with, state
ignorance? We are interested in two dimensions of state responses. First, the internal dimen-
sion, which refers to how states develop organizational narratives to sustain legitimacy and
motivate action within the organization. Second is the external dimension, referring to the rhe-
toric and decisions they adopt to satisfy the organization's external audiences.
We identify three possible state responses to ignorance. The first of these is elucidation: the
attempt to illuminate the problem by producing more knowledge. Once ignorance is exposed,
officials may decide to invest resources in commissioning studies or enhancing tools and practices
of monitoring to shed light on the problem. The second type of response is denial: officials may
refuse to accept or act on claims about ignorance. This may imply a refusal to acknowledge there
is a deficit in knowledge, whether because relevant knowledge is unreliable or unavailable
(Rayner, 2012); or because officials or political leaders deny the existence of a social problem in
need of elucidation. The third strategy is resignation: this represents an uneasy combination of
recognizing state ignorance, while maintaining that there are insurmountable obstacles to over-
coming it. In this case, officials are aware of and even explicitly acknowledge their ignorance, but
nonetheless fail to take action to address it because of acknowledged political, practical, or ethical
constraints. This can create discomfort and dissonance within the organization. In particular,
denial or resignation may undermine staff morale and organizational legitimacy.
2.3 | The case: Unauthorized migration
The issue of irregular immigration—and especially the unauthorized residence of foreign
nationals—is an excellent example of an area prone to state ignorance. It is characterized by an
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information-poor environment, which permits the cultivation of political ignorance. Irregular
residence is produced by unauthorized entry (with forged documents or clandestine entry), or
through overstay of an expired permit, visa or leave to remain. As such, those who are illegally
resident are by definition not captured in formal systems for registration and documentation.
This creates challenges in producing knowledge about the unauthorized population, whether
estimating the scale of the unauthorized population, or assessing the social and economic
impacts of irregular migrants. It also creates operational challenges, making it difficult to detect
individual cases of irregular stay or work. Even where data does exist or can be obtained, gov-
ernments may be unable or unwilling to collate and process such information, for financial,
technical, legal or ethical reasons (Vogel, 2001).
States may also be ambivalent about producing knowledge on unauthorized migrants,
encouraging strategic ignorance. Some scholars have argued that states collude with business in
tolerating irregular immigration, to help sustain a pool of low-cost, flexible labor
(Castles, 2004). Others have argued that states refrain from producing information about irregu-
lar residents because they are aware of their limited capacity to enforce policy (Bommes &
Sciortino, 2011; Slaven & Boswell, 2019). Thus public authorities may be aware that limited
resources or inadequate infrastructure constrain their ability to meet public expectations about
control. This recognition leads them to downplay the problem by omitting to produce knowl-
edge on it.
Finally, we might expect different actors to display divergent expectations about appropriate
state knowledge in this area. Thus governments and others specialized in the area may be quite
sanguine about the lack of knowledge, and aware of the methodological impediments to moni-
toring irregular residents. Other actors—such as opposition parties or the media—may be keen
to expose such omissions, identifying instances of ignorance by omission. Given the political
salience of immigration issues, we might expect virulent contestation around what states ought
to know about their populations.
However, we would also expect to see cross-national variation in the extent of, and
responses to, state ignorance on unauthorized migration. For a start, states have developed dis-
tinct infrastructures and practices for monitoring and controlling unauthorized migration,
which are likely to produce divergences in the information environment. States with more rig-
orous internal control, or which have carried out regularization programs, may (rightly or
wrongly) perceive themselves to have more comprehensive knowledge of their unauthorized
populations, or even perceive irregular stay not to be a significant social problem. Secondly, the
issue of unauthorized migration may be subject to varying levels of political attention across
countries, and over time. In cases where it attracts greater political attention, we might expect
state ignorance to be constructed as a more pressing problem. A third potential variation is in
bureaucratic cultures of knowledge. In some national systems or policy areas, there may be
strong expectations about the state's role in gathering systematic knowledge; in others, they
may be a more laissez-faire or pragmatic approach to knowledge production. This will influence
how organizations in the public administration handle instances of identified ignorance.
In order to capture these variations, we compare how bureaucracies have produced and
handled ignorance in two countries: Germany and the United Kingdom. We focus on
1990–2006, a period in which both states experienced significant numbers of asylum applica-
tions, and a corresponding problem of monitoring and returning those who had either
absconded from the asylum system, or overstayed unsuccessful asylum applications. This period
allows us to trace the evolution of state awareness and responses to the issue of irregular
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migration as and when it surfaced, with this particular time-frame capturing a number of focus-
ing events that brought the issue to the attention of civil servants and politicians.
Over this period, both countries also faced infrastructural and operational obstacles to pro-
ducing knowledge on unauthorized migrants, though for varying reasons. While Germany had
developed a robust system for internal registration and control of foreign residents, it was also
exposed to more porous borders and thus irregular entry, and also faced rigorous legal and con-
stitutional checks to monitoring residents. The United Kingdom has traditionally benefited
from its geographical position as an island, relying on border control to limit irregular entry,
but from the late 1980s increasingly experienced challenges related to unauthorized overstay
and a lack of internal checks and registration.
However, the two countries display important differences in their bureaucratic cultures.
German and United Kingdom public administration are typically associated with distinct cul-
tures of knowledge production and approaches to enforcement. While the German administra-
tion is associated with higher expectations about state knowledge and capacity to address social
problems (Rueschemeyer & Van Rossem, 1995, p. 136), the United Kindom system is seen as
more pragmatic and less legalistic (Peters, 2003), and more resigned to its lack of capacity to
control unauthorized residents (Boswell, 2009). These differences are likely to produce diver-
gences in administrative approaches to producing knowledge on irregular migrants. Thus we
would expect German officials to be under greater internal pressure to demonstrate knowledge
of social problems, with the United Kindom subject to a more flexible and pragmatic approach.
The analysis is based on 56 semi-structured interviews (31 in Germany and 25 in the U.K.)
with government officials, politicians and immigration practitioners working closely with gov-
ernment over this period. 2Responses were coded to understand how officials made sense of the
organizational and political problems confronting them; how they prioritized aspects of their
work; their beliefs about political priorities and how this shaped their priorities; their reflections
on knowledge and ignorance of irregular migration; and their beliefs about the limitations of
control and enforcement. Most respondents were retired officials, enabling them to be unusu-
ally frank in their responses; however, this also meant that in some cases, respondents lacked
detailed memory of events. To help address this, we complemented interview data with docu-
ment analysis of contemporaneous official reports, studies, and media coverage. This data were
used both to triangulate the interview data and to structure and provide prompts in interviews.
3 | THE U.K. CASE: “WE DON'T KNOW WHO WE DON'T
CONTROL”
3.1 | Political context
The issue of unauthorized migrants in the United Kingdom first surfaced in the mid-1960s,
around the problem of irregular entry and overstay by Commonwealth immigrants. Legislation
was adopted in 1968 and 1971 to prevent Commonwealth immigrants from evading entry con-
trols, and the following decade saw Home Office enforcement activities focused on border con-
trols. However, the challenges of unauthorized stay increased dramatically from around
1986–7. Instead of being admitted based on authorization to work or join family, entrants
increasingly applied for asylum either on arrival, or upon being apprehended once in the
United Kingdom. Once an asylum application was lodged, this triggered an asylum process that
could stretch over months or years. The Home Office was concerned about absconsion, either
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during the asylum process or after being rejected; or that the protracted asylum process, or lack
of documentation, would make it impossible to “remove” people at the end of the process. The
result would be an expanding population of unauthorized migrants, who could not be removed.
This created particular difficulties for an immigration system so focused on border control, and
with very little infrastructure for apprehending, detaining, and removing unauthorized resi-
dents once they were in the country. The shift in patterns of entry and stay ushered in a sense
of crisis, with Home Office officials and political leaders concerned at their lack of control of
the situation. As one official recalled of the late 1980s, “You went from something reasonably
stable to something that was in continual change and turmoil” (U.K.8).
At the same time, the Home Office was subject to sustained political pressure, which contin-
ued through the 1990s and 2000s. The media fostered a perception that a rising number of
migrants were abusing Britain's generous asylum and welfare systems. The primary concern
became that of reducing both asylum applications, and removing those whose applications had
been rejected. Home Office officials were acutely aware of this political pressure, and focused
resources on those aspects of unauthorized immigration that were linked to asylum: “You can't
do everything and this was already such a hot topic that it needed to be the focus […] The politi-
cal concern was this sense that we were as a country being exploited by people who didn't want
to come to work but were coming anyway and didn't have any entitlement to be here” (U.K.3).
As an official described the priorities of the Conservative administration in the early 1990s:
“What ministers wanted, and it became very much a key measure of activity, was removal of
failed asylum seekers” (U.K.8). This focus became even more pronounced under Prime Minister
Tony Blair, with the government introducing high profile targets on asylum. The targets
became a significant driver of Home Office attention from 2000 onwards, and other aspects of
immigration were put on the backburner. As one official put it, Blair's view was that “immigra-
tion isn't a problem, we don't want to make it one; let sleeping dogs lie. The last thing the gov-
ernment wanted to do was to have a report that said there are too many illegal immigrants in
the country, frankly” (U.K.13).
3.2 | Exposure of state ignorance
While the Home Office was preoccupied with asylum, there was widespread awareness within
the organization of the problem of unauthorized residence: “We were aware that there almost
certainly was a lot of illegal working going on and conscious that we were probably only
scratching the surface with our enforcement efforts” (U.K.3). Indeed, officials recognized that
increased irregular stay was not just a by-product of the increase in asylum-seeking. More seri-
ously, there was a perception that efforts to tighten the asylum system may have served to
increase irregular stay. “As things toughened up, I think it's probably right that there was more
an incentive, if anything to keep out of sight” (U.K.8). Thus the more stringent provisions may
have discouraged people from applying for asylum, leading to greater numbers of unauthorized
migrants who were not known to authorities. While the media was relatively quiet on this issue
through the 1990s, a number of N.G.O.s and researchers sought to bring it to the attention of
the Home Office. As one migrant rights activist explained, there was an awareness that restric-
tive measures had led to an increase in irregular migration: “But all of that was the sort of intel-
ligence that could only be known to people who were close to the community, the fact that
people weren't applying wasn't showing up in any set of statistics” (U.K.5).
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Two focusing events in the mid-2000s served to expose the issue to wider media and politi-
cal attention. First, the Home Office had set up a new immigration research unit in 2001,
whose initial program was strongly driven by its inhouse researchers, rather than by political
or operational priorities (Boswell, 2009). In early 2002, the unit commissioned researchers at
University College London to review methods for estimating the unauthorized population,
with a view to developing an estimate for the U.K. The report, completed at the end of 2002,
provided a tentative estimate of 500,000—a figure that alarmed the Home Office, which
decided not to publish the research (although it did publish a paper reviewing methods, with-
out providing an estimate). The media got wind of this research through a freedom of infor-
mation request lodged by the Guardian newspaper. But the government was quick to distance
itself from the figure, and during the election campaign of May 2005, Blair strenuously
refused to give an estimate, insisting that “You cannot determine specifically how many peo-
ple are here illegally” (BBC News, 2005). In July 2005, the Home Office published a revised
estimate of 430,000, with the popular media citing this as evidence that the government was
unable to control immigration.
The second episode was a scandal around the Home Office's failure to remove foreign
nationals who had served prison sentences in the U.K. In a series of select committee hearings
in 2005–6, Home Office officials were scrutinized over the lack of intelligence on these former
offenders—in the process exposing wider omissions in their knowledge of irregular residents.
In his evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee (May 2006), a senior official con-
ceded that the Home Office “didn't have the faintest idea” how many irregular migrants there
were in the United Kingdom. Again, there was a flurry of media attention, with the Home
Office being lambasted for its failure to enforce immigration rules. However, political attention
to the issue subsided over the following year, and the focus once again was on the more visible
aspects of immigration control. The general lack of information on irregular migration ensured
this issue did not surface in the public domain, with the political focus on those aspects that
were readily observable (Boswell, 2012). One Home Office official summed up this leptokurtic
pattern of attention to unauthorized migration. “Things tend to go in phases. The attention
may be driven by some cause célèbre, or driven by some media campaign, and suddenly all the
attention goes on that” (U.K.10).
3.3 | Responses to state ignorance
This episodic pattern of political attention to unauthorized migration created a number of pre-
dicaments for the Home Office. Officials were keenly aware of the risks for the organization in
giving less priority to unauthorized migration. They understood that there was a gap between
public expectations about immigration control, and what the Home Office could feasibly
deliver. Yet rather than attempting to produce more knowledge (elucidation), they tended to be
fatalistic about the prospects for gathering more knowledge. Thus the dominant response can
be characterized as a form of resignation: a pragmatic acceptance that it was simply not viable
to gather systematic information about the unauthorized population.
This resignation is illustrated in officials' attitude to the deficiencies of the U.K.'s infrastruc-
ture for internal control over that period—the lack of a system for registering foreign nationals,
identity cards, or extensive internal checks on migrants. One official explained this by compar-
ing the U.K. to what he knew of other European systems:
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We were much more prepared to accept that in practice, people broke rules […] an
illegal immigrant, even if you know his address when he arrives in the country,
he's not going to tell you when he moves if he doesn't want to […] All those controls
that notionally look good, actually, unless you have a complete infrastructure –
and both France and Germany are more bureaucratized than the U.K. (U.K.13).
There was a sense of fatalism about these limitations, with limited confidence that the
U.K. government could, or should, roll out more rigorous internal checks and controls. One
official described the reliance on border controls rather than internal control as “an article of
faith” across the political spectrum (U.K.9).
This pragmatic acceptance was also a product of resource limitations: “Immigration controls
are limited affairs. Limited by law and by the staff and resources you can throw at it” (U.K.2).
Home Office officials typically managed this through prioritization: acceptance that they could
not target all irregular residents, or follow-up on all information. One person described the
dilemmas as follows:
You can't detain everybody. You impose conditions on people who report, and so
on and so forth, and if they abscond you've got to go out and find them. That's diffi-
cult and very resource consuming. […] Do they start on this, or do you put them on
that? Are you going to ask the police to do a million things, or are you going to ask
them to do three? (U.K.2)
There was also an element of denial in the Home Office response. As we saw, the Home
Office research unit had commissioned research in 2002, but the political wing of the organiza-
tion was quick to dismiss this. As one senior official put it: “Various estimates were made […]
but we weren't able to say how many people were in the country who weren't entitled to be
here. Doesn't mean they were doing harm, they might have been hugely beneficial to the econ-
omy” (U.K.12). Officials also repeatedly suggested that irregular residents who were working
hard and keeping their heads down were not an operational priority, implying a denial that this
constituted a serious policy problem.
Another strategy of denial involved downplaying the importance of knowledge of the
unauthorized population, instead favoring symbolic deterrence measures as a preferred policy
approach. As one official put it, officials had to balance a focus on internal control “against, as
it were, the opportunity benefit – the future asylum cases not generated because people thought
that the U.K. was less attractive as a destination” (U.K.7). Indeed, there was a strongly held
notion in the Home Office that introducing restrictions on asylum and enforcing removals
would send out a signal to potential future applicants.
You make these firm pronouncements that only these categories of people are
going to qualify and everybody else will have to go home, but you know that ulti-
mately, it's only a small proportion who are going to be compelled to go. The more
you can make the bluff work, the more people will say, “OK, enough is enough,
I've had my decision. I realise I've got to go, I will go” (U.K.3).
The use of the term “bluff” is revealing here: the official appeared to be referring both to the
messaging to asylum seekers, and to internal organizational beliefs about the effectiveness of
this approach. As he continued, “we always knew that it was a small proportion of the refusals
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who ended up being deported. I suppose it was a mixture of complacency and bluff […] Bluff is
endemic to immigration control” (U.K.3). So in this sense, officials persuaded themselves that
deterrence obviated the need for intelligence about unauthorized migrants.
Of course, this form or resignation was difficult to sustain once Home Office ignorance was
exposed to external scrutiny in 2005. Yet rather than prompting a rethink, if anything, this
exposure reinforced the Home Office's strategy of resignation. There was widespread sympathy
with the admission by the Head of Removals that the organization “didn't have a clue” how
many irregular migrants were resident in the United Kingdom. As one official explained, “[T]
here's a lot of truth in that. He didn't necessarily know. And we still don't really. I mean, we do
this counting, and produce this net migration figure, but we don't have full control, so we don't
really know” (U.K.4). Or as another former official put it, “Many people in I.N.D. [Immigration
and Nationality Directorate] said, good on you Dave, you told it as it is, of course we haven't
the faintest idea, why are they asking this question? Don't they know, we only know what we
know. We know what we control. By definition, we don't know who we don't control” (U.K.22).
Home Office reactions to this admission suggested that the exposure of ignorance was in some
senses cathartic, a welcome release of tension for an organization that felt it had been struggling
alone with this uncomfortable truth. The sense was that the incident helped align public and
organizational understandings about the challenges of producing reliable knowledge in
this area.
In sum, Home Office officials over this period were subject to strong political pressure to
focus on asylum, rather than the wider population of unauthorized residents. Officials were
aware of a wider population of unauthorized migration, but given political priorities and limited
resources, they did not see these as a priority area for enforcement, and thus had limited incen-
tives to produce knowledge on this population. Thus their strategy most closely resembled one
of resignation: an awareness of their ignorance, but a belief that there were insurmountable
obstacles to overcoming it. The case also suggests elements of denial, insofar as officials either
denied the importance of unauthorized migration as a social problem, or claimed that it was
best addressed through deterrence rather than internal control based on intelligence. However,
these strategies of denial and resignation created political risks for the organization, as illus-
trated in the mid-2000s scandal over Home Office ignorance of unauthorized migrants.
4 | THE GERMAN CASE: “WHAT ISN'T IN THE FILES, ISN'T
IN THE WORLD”
4.1 | Political context
Unlike the United Kingdom, Germany has a robust system of population monitoring, including
a general registration duty for national and foreign residents, identity checks, and a central
database on foreign residents developed in the early 1950s (Badenhoop, 2020). However, the
challenges of unauthorized stay became a major political concern during the late 1980s and
1990s. Germany received one million ethnic German immigrants between 1989 and 1992, as
well as 1.8 million asylum applications between 1987 and 1995, many refugees from civil war in
the Former Yugoslavia. Against this background, the 1990 reform of the Foreigners Act
(Ausländergesetz) reaffirmed the traditional self-understanding of Germany as not a country of
immigration (Herbert, 2001, p. 284). In an attempt to enhance control of migrant residents, par-
agraph 76(2) of the 1990 Foreigners Act introduced a reporting duty for all public institutions,
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including schools and hospitals, to inform the foreigners authorities about the presence of an
irregular migrant.1
However, the growth in asylum applications and low recognition rates generated a growing
population of rejected asylum seekers (Bade, 2002, p. 389). Many of these rejected applicants
were legally “obliged to leave the country” (Ausreisepflichtige) but could not be deported
because of a lack of documentation or because they were temporarily “tolerated” (Geduldete)
for humanitarian reasons. Political attention focused on this group of migrants whose presence
was considered unauthorized, but whose residence was usually known to the foreigner
authorities.
Politicians and officials showed less concern about migrants absconding. There was a wide-
spread perception that the generous welfare system provided a strong incentive for rejected asy-
lum seekers to remain known to the authorities, despite the risk of deportation (G2, G5). As the
former Bavarian Interior Minister explained: “The central problem was not those who live
undercover. We regularly tried to get those, among others through routine checks. The real
problem were those whose asylum application was rejected and who extended their proce-
dure” (G2).
The political focus was thus firmly on unauthorized but “known” rejected asylum appli-
cants, and there was a widespread assumption that the robust German monitoring system
would pick up undocumented migrants sooner or later. As a senior official in the federal work
ministry put it: “We strongly believed that the German control system is functioning well, that
we get everyone” (G18).
4.2 | Exposure of state ignorance
Over the 1990s, activists from the churches, unions, and a number of Green Party politicians
began to raise awareness of the living conditions of the sans papiers, who faced serious barriers
to accessing wages, housing, healthcare and education, especially following the introduction of
the 1990 legislation. Both Protestant and Catholic church groups started campaigning more vig-
orously on these issues in the early 1990s (G16). The Catholic Migration Commissioner was one
of the first to break the silence on the issue, including through pursuing “dinner diplomacy” by
lobbying individual politicians and officials: “I conducted countless confidential conversations
in ministries and parliaments at the federal and state levels, and nobody wanted this [the issue
of irregular migrants] to ever become known” (G13).
In 1996, the European Jesuit Refugee Service commissioned research into the living condi-
tions of irregular migrants in Germany (Alt, 1999) and other European countries. In 2000, the
German bishop conference published a statement estimating “the number of illegal residents in
Germany over one million” (cited in Bührle, 2001, p. 57). They were joined by the trade unions,
who began to signal solidarity with migrants as victims of exploitation (G12). The unions
became more active in employer inspections and in legal protection of undocumented migrants,
contributing to growing attention to the issue. These activities began to influence a number of
politicians at the federal level, and the Süssmuth Commission on Immigration in 2001 rec-
ommended waiving reporting duties for schools and teachers (G3, G4). At the same time, dele-
gates and councilors from the Green Party in various cities brought the issue of irregular
migrant residents into parliamentary debate at the local level, including in Munich and Ham-
burg (G19, G28).
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Thus unlike in the U.K. where officials were always aware of the problem, and public expo-
sure of the problem was more episodic and communicated in mass media reporting, in Ger-
many this exposure took the form of lobbying activities by a range of social organizations
including the churches, N.G.O.s and unions.
4.3 | Responses to state ignorance
While most of our interviewees were aware of the figures published by the Catholic church and
the Jesuit Refugee Service, these numbers were generally dismissed by officials working at the
federal level, who saw no need to comment on these statements (G18). This dismissal of the
scale of the undocumented migrant population was in part justified by methodological doubts
about these studies. As an official in the federal work ministry explained, “It was a grey area.
Nobody knew how to gather data on this. […] There was never an attempt to statistically grasp
illegals because that was just out of question” (G18). The official went on to explain their
response to estimates of the scale of the problem:
I kind of refused to know, and told myself “What we don't know, doesn't exist.”
That this phenomenon existed was out of question and I think the Jesuits talked
about a million. And we always said: “Where did they get that figure, how can they
possibly know that?” We don't know that. We honestly did not know. And besides
I would not have known how we could have effectively done research about
that. (G18)
The dismissal of these studies suggests a strategy of denial: officials rejected N.G.O. claims
about state ignorance based on their skepticism about the reliability of the information, or
indeed the viability of producing such knowledge. But it was also clearly convenient to evade
knowledge of a problem that would have carried strong expectations about state enforcement.
Indeed, many of the responses suggest a form of quite conscious denial, even irony. As the for-
mer Bavarian Interior Minister explained: “What isn't in the files, isn't in the world. That's a
legal proposition in Germany” (G2). Or as an activist described the attitude at the time: “What
doesn't exist is not in need of regulation” (G13). From the perspective of the state, non-
knowledge is unthinkable. This resonates with previous findings on local authority responses to
undocumented migrants in Frankfurt (Krieger, Ludwig, Schupp, & Will, 2006, p. 175).
This idea about the link between state knowledge and enforcement was bound up with legal
norms of law enforcement and coherence inherent to the Rechtsstaat and notably the principle
of compulsory prosecution (Legalitätsprinzip): “The moment we knew, here is an illegal, he had
to go of course. In those instances we had to act because of the Legalitätsprinzip which bound
us very strongly. In that sense we always believed as soon as an illegal is detected, that's him
gone” (G18). This construct of the knowing and enforcing state implied strong norms within
the public administration around coherent state behavior. As a senior civil servant in the fed-
eral work administration explained:
I always said: “Guys, whoever is illegal, has to leave the country.” […] The state
cannot be schizophrenic. State organizations who have to organize the removal
and deportation [of migrants] have to be informed by other state organizations so
that the state can act in a logical, coherent way. […] We should not reward those
12 BOSWELL AND BADENHOOP
who violate our immigration laws […] Whoever is illegal, has to leave the coun-
try. (G3)
On first glance, this might imply that legal doctrine and cultural norms in public adminis-
tration militated in the direction of elucidation. And yet the very stringency of this requirement
produced the opposite effect: a desire to avoid knowledge that could not be followed up
on. Thus the obligation to follow-up on suspected irregular migrants encouraged strategies of
both denial and resignation.
In this light, the “reporting duty” created by the 1990 legislation was generally seen as an
encumbrance. Officials would rather retain opacity on cases of unauthorized residence, than be
obliged to follow them up. Part of the concern about following up was linked to humanitarian
and human rights considerations, which often militated against more rigorous enforcement.
Officials at all levels of government mentioned humanitarian and human rights concerns,
which militated against more rigorous prosecution of irregular migrants, specifically given
Germany's Nazi history (G1, G6, G18, and G20). As one former senior official in the federal
work ministry explained, gathering personal data on people with a migration background was
“just a no-go” (G18). Another official from the federal interior ministry explained: “You cannot
implement rigorous measures to simply exclude these people from the asylum process, as some
states suggested, because this would violate human rights standards” (G6).
In this sense, gathering more information about unauthorized residents was “negative
knowledge” (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) because there was an awareness of the potentially adverse
repercussions of shedding light on this area. One official in the federal work ministry felt this
tension particularly acutely. Initially a strong supporter of the reporting duties, after attending
the 2005 annual Catholic conference on “illegality,” he recognized the “huge gap between the
image in my head and the real world” (G3). He described his changing attitude as a “a Dama-
scene conversion” and, while maintaining general support for reporting duties, he began to
favor exemption of schools:
Then I learned that when these reporting duties are strictly enforced, they do not
have the effect that we gain more knowledge about children in schools who are
here illegally with their parents. Rather, the children will remain in the illegality
and won't go to school. In that case we create ourselves a problem in a few years'
time that is much bigger than the logical problem. The state would be schizo-
phrenic if on the one hand it acted to enforce your return, if necessary through
forced deportation, and on the other hand, authorities in another area of the state
where illegal migrants appear refrained from the duty to report. In this case, I
would rather live with the schizophrenic behavior of the state than accept a much
bigger societal problem for the state and individual hardship. (G3)
This official thus preferred to accept that there was evasion that the state did not follow-up,
even though this made the state appear “schizophrenic.” Indeed, interviews confirmed that the
reporting duty was never actively implemented, either by public service providers or law
enforcers in the administration (G1, G2, and G4).
This type of resignation was more widespread at the local state (Land) level, where the
social problems of undocumented migrants were most visible and thus difficult to ignore. The
presence of irregular migrants without access to adequate housing, healthcare, employment,
and education became a serious problem in cities like Munich. Indeed, officials in Munich
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adopted a more pragmatic approach to knowledge production and enforcement. Part of this
pragmatism reflected a recognition of the state's limited capacities and resources. For example,
the Munich foreigner authorities decided to prioritize criminals and suspected terrorists for
security reasons, and neglected tourist and student overstayers or au pairs (G1). Even the for-
mer Bavarian Interior Minister who was known as a “hardliner” on irregular migrants kept no
illusions and acknowledged that:
What I learned throughout the years is that there is never 100 per cent precision in
this area. […] In police states in the past, the policeman knew who lived in the vil-
lage. Whenever somebody came to visit, he would know. In a city like Munich,
where there are millions of tourists, nobody knows who is there. And that's OK, we
can accept that because tourists are normally not significant in terms of criminal
activities. If it's not significant from the perspective of criminality or social benefits,
then it's not important to know who is there. (G2)
Similarly to the United Kingdom case, then, the administration faced limited resources and
had to prioritize how it followed up on cases of irregular migration.
In sum, the practical and ethical challenges involved in pursuing sans papiers, and the polit-
ical attention devoted to asylum, led the federal authorities to focus their efforts on the Ged-
uldete. German authorities were aware that there was a wider problem of sans papiers but were
reluctant to gather more knowledge on this. This reluctance stemmed in part from skepticism
of claims about the scale of the problem—a strategy of denial. We can also see evidence of resig-
nation, whereby officials preferred to limit their awareness of instances of irregular migration,
because of their reluctance or inability to follow-up on such cases. Indeed, resignation in the
German case was characterized as a form of “schizophrenia.” Officials saw themselves and their
actions as in some sense separate from the abstract notion of a Rechtsstaat that rigorously
enforces its laws. This cultural construct—the knowing and enforcing state—was decoupled
from the informal goals and operational priorities of the public administration, which were
guided by more pragmatic considerations.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This article explored the neglected question of how states perceive and handle ignorance. It
conceptualized state ignorance along a continuum from a reticence about producing knowledge
on social problems (strategic ignorance), through to inadvertent oversight, which is identified
as ignorance by other actors, or in retrospect (ignorance by omission). We argued that the iden-
tification of state ignorance was likely to expose organizations in the public administration to
both internal tensions, as they reconcile ignorance with organizational norms about knowledge
and control; and external risks, as the public administration addresses expectations from their
environment about epistemic authority. The article examined the strategies states adopted to
handle such instances of ignorance, identified as elucidation, denial, and resignation.
Our analysis of how German and United Kingdom officials handled ignorance on
unauthorized migrants showed that despite quite different control infrastructures, there were
many similarities in their strategies. In both cases, civil servants acknowledged the likelihood
that there was a significant number of irregular migrants not known to the authorities. But nei-
ther administration made significant efforts to produce more knowledge of these populations,
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eschewing a strategy of elucidation. This reflected their awareness of the considerable obstacles
to apprehending or removing unauthorized migrants. In both cases, officials were reluctant to
expose the gap between expectations raised by enhanced knowledge of the social problem and
ineffective enforcement. There was little evidence of an ulterior motive behind this reticence: it
appeared to be motivated by a need to buffer the state from unrealistic expectations, rather than
a desire to promote particular vested interests.
Rather than pursuing a strategy of elucidation, officials in both countries embraced a combi-
nation of denial and resignation. In the United Kingdom, officials denied that unauthorized
migration posed a significant social problem, and/or questioned whether knowledge production
was an appropriate route to addressing it. Instead, officials tended to embrace deterrence as a
more effective approach—thus aligning operational goals with the clear political prioritization
of dealing with asylum. Even more pronounced than denial, though, was a form of resignation
about the U.K.'s capacity to enforce internal checks and controls. Given this strong perception
of the state's incapacity, for many officials the problem of ignorance did not even arise. The
mantra of “we can't know what we don't control” effectively absolved the organization of
responsibility to know. And yet this resignation risked political exposure, as occurred in the
context of the foreign nationals scandal in 2005. In this sense, the Home Office did not self-
define as “ignorant,” but had this label thrust upon it by intrusive political and media scrutiny.
In the German case, federal authorities exuded more confidence about the limited scale of
the problem, and their capacity to enforce controls, in line with earlier studies (Vogel
et al., 2009). Indeed, some responses implied a strategy of denial. However, many officials were
aware of a wider problem, which produced strong discomfort. Entrenched norms around state
enforcement and legal coherence created a paradox of a formal commitment to produce knowl-
edge, coupled with an informal acceptance that robust enforcement may create practical and
ethical problems—or “schizophrenia”. Thus the German case suggests a different form of resig-
nation, one in which the conflict between the ideal and what was realistic were internalized
within the organization's own goals and self-understanding.
Thus in both cases, we see an ambivalence about knowledge production; but while in the
United Kingdom the Home Office was fairly clear (and comfortable) about the reasons for not
producing knowledge on unauthorized migrants, in Germany a strong culture of legal enforce-
ment, especially at the federal level, created considerable unease. The main challenge for
U.K. officials was therefore in managing the gap between administrative and political expecta-
tions. For German officials, by contrast, the challenge was one of reconciling two conflicting
sets of priorities within the public administration—that of rule of law, and more practical and
ethical considerations that militated toward a lenient approach. This divergence in the handling
of ignorance was to some extent influenced by differences in internal control infrastructures:
while U.K. officials invoked the lack of such infrastructure to exempt them from knowledge
production, German officials felt they had no such excuse. But the divergence was also strongly
shaped by administrative cultures of enforcement. Paradoxically, where there was a stronger
expectation about robust enforcement, as in Germany, there appeared to be a greater desire to
avoid knowledge production. Partial knowledge of a social problem generated a requirement
for action, which the authorities were aware they could not redeem.
The analysis has implications for how we understand states and knowledge production.
While much of the literature has assumed that public authorities are keen to enhance their
knowledge of social problems, here we have an instance of states avoiding knowledge of social
problems they know they cannot adequately control. There was limited interest in producing
knowledge on social problems that public authorities believed they could not mitigate. This
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supports a view of the state as driven by concerns about legitimacy first and foremost: the
impulse to expand state control or governmentality needs to be understood as subordinate to
this goal, rather than driving it. Our analysis suggests that states have a surprisingly high toler-
ance of ignorance, in cases where elucidation would expose their operational limitations.
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ENDNOTE
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